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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
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LLOYD HARRISON HARROD, III,
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NO. 45988
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR-2017-14225

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lloyd Harrod contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence in his case.

Specifically, he asserts the district court failed to give sufficient

consideration to the mitigating factors in the record when it imposed a sentence with exceeded
even the prosecutor’s recommendation for the fixed term. As such, it did not reach its decision
in an exercise of reason. Therefore, this Court should either reduce Mr. Harrod’s sentence as it
deems appropriate or, alternatively, remand this case for a new sentencing hearing.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Harrod pled guilty to aggravated assault on a law
enforcement officer with a firearm enhancement, eluding, and unlawful possession of a firearm.
(Tr., p.1, Ls.12-13.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss several other charges, and to
recommend a sentence with a maximum fixed term of five years, to run concurrent to another
sentence for which Mr. Harrod had been on parole. (Tr., p.1, Ls.14-17.) The prosecutor
ultimately recommended a sentence with five years fixed and twenty years indeterminate.
(Tr., p.21, Ls.1-15.)
Mr. Harrod accepted responsibly for his actions.

(Presentence Investigation Report

(hereinafter, PSI), p.5.) He offered the following insights, not as excuses, but as an explanation
for his actions: his actions were the product of a relapse, and due to the effects of his drug use,
he did not realize the people chasing him were police officers; all he knew at the time was that
someone was chasing him, wanting to hurt him, and he was trying to get away from them. (PSI,
pp.5-6.) Mr. Harrod expressed remorse for his actions and apologized to the officer and other
victims for all his actions that night. (PSI, p.6; Tr., p.25, Ls.21-24.)
The mental health evaluation diagnosed Mr. Harrod with several conditions: bipolar
disorder, anxiety disorder, stimulant dependence, and personality disorder. (PSI, p.151.) It
recommended medically monitored care in a controlled setting. (PSI, p.152.) The PSI author
ultimately recommended a period of incarceration, during which Mr. Harrod could prove his
dedication to rehabilitation. (PSI, p.25.)
Mr. Harrod acknowledged his need for additional treatment, particularly as it related to
his substance abuse issues. (PSI, p.21.) Defense counsel noted that, since being incarcerated in
this case, Mr. Harrod had already begun showing improvements, and that he was demonstrating
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his commitment to rehabilitation by taking and completing classes available in the jail.
(Tr., p.22, Ls.3-9, p.24, Ls.14-16.) Defense counsel recommended the district court only impose
sentences with fixed terms of three years. (Tr., p.24, Ls.16-24.) He also recommended the
district court consider retaining jurisdiction so Mr. Harrod could receive the intensive treatment
available in the rider program, as Mr. Harrod noted he had not received such treatment before.
(Tr., p.25, Ls.2-14, 24-25.)
The district court acknowledged the role drug use has played in this case, but it also noted
that Mr. Harrod had received prior opportunities for treatment and programming. (Tr., p.26,
Ls.19-23.) The district court also noted Mr. Harrod’s significant criminal history, as well as the
nature of his conduct in this case (firing at police officers while fleeing from them). (Tr., p.27,
Ls.2-24.) As such, it imposed unified sentences of five years, all fixed, on the eluding and
firearms charges, and a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with eight years fixed, on the
aggravated assault charge. (Tr., p.27, L.25 - p.28, L.6.) It ordered all the sentences to run
concurrent with one another. (Tr., p.28, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Harrod filed a notice of appeal timely from
the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.83, 86.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence on
Mr. Harrod.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence On Mr. Harrod
When a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
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public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). Accordingly, in order
to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision, he must show that, in
light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997); see Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 86364 (2018) (articulating the standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its
discretion).
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:

(1) protection of society;

(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and
(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider.
Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).

State v.

The Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that

rehabilitation is the first means the district court should consider to achieve that goal. See
State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v.
Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
In this case, the district court decided to impose a sentence with an extended fixed term
because previous attempts to provide treatment had not been successful, as evidenced by his
criminal history and his actions in this case.

(Tr., p.26, L.19 - p.28, L.12.)

However,

rehabilitation is a process, not a one-time event. See, e.g., State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815
(Ct. App. 2010) (recognizing the rehabilitation process by noting that “acknowledgment of guilt
is a critical first step toward rehabilitation”) (emphasis added); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38
n.64 (1967) (acknowledging that “counsel can play an important role in the process of
rehabilitation” for juvenile offenders). As such, it is not reasonable to downplay that particular
sentencing objective just because prior efforts toward rehabilitation were not been as successful
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as they might have been. Compare United States v. Hawkins, 380 F.Supp.2d 143, 144 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (explaining that “[t]he fact that the defendant engaged in further criminal activity while
she was in the process of rehabilitation does not preclude a finding of extraordinary
rehabilitation” or the imposition of a more lenient sentence in recognition of that fact).
In this case, the aggregate sentence recommended by defense counsel provided for two
avenues to rehabilitation while still taking the nature of Mr. Harrod’s actions and the other goals
of sentencing into account. (Tr., p.24, Ls.16-24 (indicating the district court could consider a
longer indeterminate sentence in order to account for those other aspects of sentencing).) The
period of retained jurisdiction, for example, would provide Mr. Harrod access to more-intensive
programming to which he had not previously had access. And if he did not show sufficient
improvement at the end of that period of retained jurisdiction, he could still be ordered to
continue serving his sentences at that point.
Additionally, the shorter fixed term defense counsel (or even the prosecutor)
recommended would allow for additional treatment before the parole board considered the
possibility of paroling Mr. Harrod again. Sentences are, after all, supposed to be crafted such
that they provide timely access to rehabilitation and they do not force the prison system to
continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of recidivism.
Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639
(Ct. App. 1988). Mr. Harrod, for example, was fifty-three years old at the time of sentencing,
and the prosecutor pointed out that a sentence with an extended indeterminate term would likely
provide supervision of Mr. Harrod for the rest of his life.

(PSI, p.1; Tr., p.21, Ls.1-15.)

However, the parole board would still retain discretion to not release Mr. Harrod if he did not
show progress toward rehabilitation during that time. See State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931
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(2005). In fact, that is precisely what the PSI author recommended the district court should do.
(PSI, p.25.)
Thus, by imposing a sentence without considering the possibility of rehabilitation going
forward, as demonstrated by the mitigating factors in this record, the district court abused its
discretion because the sentence does not serve all the goals of sentencing.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Harrod respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 30th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of November, 2018, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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